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Views from A Tribal Court: How the Indian
Civil Rights Act Led to Civil Rights Violations

Anne Bruno

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2017, I found myself driving down a remote tribal
road to attend an arraignment at a Tribal Court1 for the first time. As I
followed the directions provided, which were vague to an outsider
unfamiliar with the common points of reference, I even found myself
almost traveling down a road restricted for only Pueblo2 member’s use. I
eventually arrived at the courthouse and entered a building that is normally
used for tribal council meetings. As I had been invited to attend the court’s
docket, the judge came outside, greeted me, and showed me around. The
Tribal Court is held in the Tribal Council Chamber. The chairs are pushed
to the edges of the room, a normal table is placed at the front, and there is
an additional table placed in front of where the defendant was to stand.
Another table was pushed to the side and available for use by the Nation’s
Prosecution, when present. There were also microphones and a recording
system set up for all those present. This set up resembled the look of a
western-style court and was my first indication that some of what I was to
observe would function somewhat like the courts I was accustomed to.
As a non-native law student trained in the western or AngloAmerican justice system, I had anticipated seeing something completely
unfamiliar. Instead, there were many similarities to a western-style criminal
justice system. However it appeared to lack some of the civil rights
protections of the western-style system. I watched as defendants entered
pleas without counsel and struggled to understand the meaning of legal
terms. The judge in this court was law-trained and explained that the
judge’s role in this court allowed provided more judicial power over the
defendants. The defendants’ lack of representation and ignorance of the law
often means the judge is forced to both protect the defendants’ due process
while also considering the Pueblo’s interest in convictions. This is


Anne Bruno is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of New Mexico School of Law and is
expected to graduate in the spring of 2019. She has a Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology and a minor in
American Indian Studies from the University of Arizona. The author would like to thank the Judge,
Professor Barbara Creel, and Professor Christine Zuni Cruz, whose help and assistance made this paper
possible.
1
For the purposes of this paper I have chosen to keep the specific Pueblo anonymous. This decision was
made to keep the focus on the issues presented by ICRA and to allow any tribe to see themselves in this
case example. I hope that it will encourage tribal leaders to take a second look at the structures they have
created to determine if there are any civil rights violations present and how best to address those.
2
Throughout this paper, “Pueblo” will refer to the specific tribe I was researching and “pueblo” will
refer generally to all pueblos.
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especially true as BIA law enforcement officers, who function as both the
law enforcement and the prosecution, are only present at trials, not
arraignments.
The Tribal Court observed has a hybrid structure. The governance
structure of the Pueblo was formed through a complex history of oversight
from four sovereigns. The Pueblo utilizes its original chthonic law3 as
modified by the civil legal traditions of Spain and Mexico. One of the most
recent modifications, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA),4 was
imposed by the fourth outside sovereign in the history of oversight, the
United States. Some of the impacts to Pueblo court structures of the United
States were the adoption of state’s codes, separation of powers, and most
significantly, the ICRA. Not all these changes resulted in positive
outcomes, as I witnessed firsthand.
The ICRA imposed western values onto tribal governments and
tribal court structures to enable tribal courts to work within the American
construct. This has pushed the tribes towards more western court structures.
However, due to the limitations of the ICRA, many tribes have not
instituted western court structures with the full civil rights protections of
western systems. One of those limitations is a defendant’s right to counsel.
In all state and federal jurisdictions, defendants have the right to counsel
regardless of whether they can afford counsel. In contrast, under the ICRA,
tribal members are given the right to counsel; however, they may only
enjoy that right if they provide the counsel at their own expense. And, while
some tribes have the financial capacity to create a public defender’s office,
others do not. Because the ICRA does not mandate that counsel be
appointed to indigent defendants, many face situations like the one I
observed, where a western court structure was adopted but defendants have
no guide through an unfamiliar structure.
This paper will explore the ICRA and its practical application
within one contemporary Pueblo court structure. Part I of this paper
provides a brief background on the ICRA and how it came to be. Part II of
this paper describes six arraignment hearings observed over the course of
five months within one tribal court. To provide context to these cases, this
section begins with a brief introduction into pueblo history and culture. This
section will conclude with my overall observations of the court hearings.
However, it is important to note that this paper represents only one pueblo
Chthonic is a term to describe the various legal structures of indigenous or aboriginal peoples. “To
describe a legal tradition as chthonic is thus to attempt to describe a tradition by criteria internal to itself,
as opposed to imposed criteria. It is an attempt to see the tradition from within, in spite of all problems
of language and perception, and to see it from a time prior to the emergence of colonial language.”
PATRICK H. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN THE LAW 62 (5th
ed. 2014).
4
Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 13021-03 (1968).
3
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court. Each pueblo has its own unique governance structure and culture,
despite some broad similarities. One glaring similarity that the pueblos
share is the common history of federal Indian law, including that of the
ICRA.
I.

History of the Indian Civil Rights Act

The history of the ICRA does not begin with its enactment in 1968,
but rather shortly after the formation of this country in 1790. The ICRA was
the culmination of a long history of legislation regarding the legal processes
in Indian country. This legislative interference in Indian Country began in
the 1790s when Congress passed various Trade and Intercourse Acts which
defined jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians.5 The jurisdiction that was
established by these acts was codified in the General Crimes Act of 1817
(GCA), also known as the Indian Country Crimes Act.6 The Act “respected
inherent tribal authority over internal affairs” and exempted Indian
defendants whose crimes occurred on Indian land from federal
prosecution.7 This in turn supported inherent tribal sovereignty and upheld
traditional tribal customs for those crimes which the tribe prosecuted.8
The GCA was followed by the Major Crimes Act of 1885 (MCA).9
The MCA provides that the federal government has control over all serious
crimes committed on Indian land, regardless of whether the defendant is
Indian or non-Indian.10 Prior to this Act, the federal government had
jurisdiction only over crimes committed by Indians that were included in
the Trade and Intercourse Acts or those which were included in specific
treaty agreements.11 All other crimes were handled by the traditional tribal
5

These acts were permanently codified in 1834 with the passage of The Trade and Intercourse Act of
1834. Barbara Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional
Imperative, 18 Mich. J. of Race & L. 317, 334 (2013).
6
The act reads in full:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of
offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of
another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been
punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006) (originally enacted in 1817); TRIBAL COURT CLEARING
HOUSE, General Guide to Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, http://www.tribalinstitute.org/lists/jurisdiction.htm.
7
Creel, supra note 4, at 335.
8
See Creel, supra note 4, at 335.
9
Major Crimes Act, 62 Stat. 683 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)).
10
Id.
11
See Creel, supra note 4, at 335.
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law of the specific tribes.12 This law extended federal jurisdiction over all
defendants in Indian country for the specified crimes and severely limited
the previously exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the tribes.13 This change in
the federal relationship was driven forward by a U.S. Supreme Court case,
Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog).14
In Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, a member of the Great Sioux Nation
had murdered another Sioux Indian on the Great Sioux reservation in
Dakota Territory.15 The tribe, exercising its criminal jurisdiction and
sovereignty, resolved the crime through their traditional system requiring
Kan-gi-shun-ca’s family to provide the victim’s family with reparations
totaling $600.00 in cash, eight horses, and one blanket.16 He was also tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death by the First Judicial District of the
Dakota Territory.17 Through a writ of habeas corpus to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Kan-gi-shun-ca successfully challenged his conviction.18 The court
held that the federal court “was without jurisdiction to find or try the
indictment against the prisoner, that the conviction and sentence [were]
void, and that his imprisonment [was] illegal.”19 This meant that the United
States Supreme Court was upholding the tribal court’s decision, and finding
that the United States had no jurisdiction over the crime. This decision to
uphold tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction provided a means for Congress to
enact a law establishing federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians who
committed a crime against another Indian, the Major Crimes Act (MCA).20
The express purpose of the MCA was to further the so-called
“civilization” of Indians, through criminal laws. Representative Cutcheon21
stated that through this Act “many Indians would be civilized a great deal
sooner by being put under federal criminal laws and taught to regard life
and the personal property of others.”22 This was one of many direct assaults
on the culture and sovereignty of the tribes. The establishment of Courts of
Indian Offenses (CIO) followed the MCA.23
12

Id.
The specified crimes include: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, incest, felony assault,
assault against a minor, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, and robbery. 62 Stat. 683.
14
Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
15
Id. at 557.
16
See Creel, supra note 4, at 336 n. 118.
17
Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, at 557.
18
Id. at 572.
19
Id.
20
A similar bill was proposed in 1874 but was ultimately unsuccessful. Kevin Washburn, Federal
Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 798-803 (2006).
21
Representative Cutcheon was the sponsor of the MCA.
22
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1978) (quoting 16 Cong. Rec. 936 (1885) (remarks of
Rep. Cutcheon)).
23
Also referred to as CFR courts after the Code of Federal Regulation where the criminal laws are
codified. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.100-.1214.
13
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In 1883 various federally run CIOs were established by the
Secretary of the Interior to “be a step in the direction of bringing the Indians
under the civilizing influence of the law.”24 The CIOs’ main function was to
criminalize the religious and cultural practices of the tribes.25 However,
they also took over all criminal jurisdiction, supplanting tribal jurisdiction
where CIOs were established.26 In addition to criminalizing simply being an
Indian–by punishing cultural and religious practices–the court procedures
often resulted in serious civil rights violations. The judges were Indians or
the Indian police force.27 Under a false impression that attorneys would
confuse the judges and criminals would get away with crimes due to a
technicality, attorneys were prohibited from the court room. 28 Without
defense, the Indian defendants were put in jeopardy, “which was consistent
with the purpose of the reservation and the court system to educate and
civilize the Indian.”29
The next change in tribal court systems occurred in 1934 with the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). IRA provided:
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council
by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also
vest in such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and
powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing
of fess to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior;
to prevent the sale, disposition, lease or encumbrance of tribal
lands, interests in land, or other tribal assets without the consent of
the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, State, and local
Governments.30
This tied the exercise of the stated rights and powers to the
adoption of an IRA constitution, resulting in many tribes adopting an
approved constitution to take advantage of the benefits. After Congress
passed the IRA, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) created a draft

24

NORTH DAKOTA STUDIES, Court of Indian Offenses, https://www.ndstudies.gov/content/courtsindian-offenses (quoting Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, H. Exec. Doc. 1 (1883) (Serial
Set 2190)).
25
See North Dakota Studies, supra note 23; Creel, supra note 4, at 338-40.
26
Creel, supra note 4, at 340.
27
William T. Hagan, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN ACCULTURATION AND CONTROL
109 (Yale Univ. Press 1966); Creel, supra note 4, at 340.
28
25 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1958) (repealed by 26 Fed. Reg. 4360-61 (May 19, 1961)); Creel, supra note 4, at
340; Hagan, supra note 26, at 120.
29
United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) (defending the creation of the courts as
necessary for the education and civilization of Indians); Creel, supra note 4, at 341 n. 153.
30
Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984, 73 Cong. Ch. 576 § 16 (1934) (emphasis added) (codified as
25 U.S.C. § 476(e) (1934)).
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constitution for tribes to use.31 The draft constitution was itself modeled
after the U.S. Constitution and laws rather than tribal customs.32 As a result,
the tribal constitutions often included aspects of the federal criminal justice
system, such as the western protections of individual rights and the
prohibition on attorneys in the courtroom in CIOs.33 While the federal
prohibition on attorneys was eventually removed in 1961, tribes could only
change their constitutions with the permission of the BIA. 34 Due to a
cumbersome process, cultural practices, and economic situations, many
tribes elected not to amend their constitutions.35 At the time, 181 tribes
adopted the IRA, although not all of them created constitutions.36
In 1961, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
initiated an investigation into civil rights violations in Indian country.37 This
investigation was prompted by an independent study by the Fund for the
Republic38 and a Department of the Interior report which examined the civil
rights problems of individual Indians.39 The purpose of the Senate
investigation was “to investigate the civil rights gap for tribal people due to
the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments.”40 By 1968,
Congress had determined how best to solve these civil rights problems in
Indian country and enacted the ICRA.41 The ICRA was not passed by
31

It is not known how many of the tribes received this draft constitution but is was circulated to some of
the tribes and was used as a model for BIA agents as they advised the tribes on what to include in their
constitutions. DAVID E. WILKINS, Introduction to FELIX COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL
CONSTITUTIONS, xxiii (2006).
32
Creel, supra note 4, at 343.
33
Id. This inclusion is not surprising as the government officials drafting model constitution would be
heavily influenced by what they knew, the United States Constitution. However, the reason for these
inclusions does not negate the impact created.
34
Id. at 344.
35
Id. at 343-344.
36
The number of tribes who did adopt constitutions at the time is unclear. Wilkins, supra note 30, at
xxii. Currently there are 573 tribes, approximately 440 of these tribes have constitutions. TRIBAL COURT
CLEARINGHOUSE, Tribal Constitutions (last visited Nov. 11, 2017), http://www.tribalinstitute.org/lists/constitutions.htm.
37
Creel, supra note 4, at 344.
38
Id. (citing FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (William A. Brophy & Sophie D. Aberle eds., 1961)).
39
Id. (citing TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, A PROGRAM FOR INDIAN
CITIZENS (1961)).
40
Id. at 344; Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights
inapplicable to tribal governments.).
41
The Act provided, in part:
Sec. 202. No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall—
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of
speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a
redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
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Congress without comment from Indian tribes. Among the various tribes
who testified before Congress were the pueblos.42 The main argument
against the ICRA made by the pueblos was that the enactment of the ICRA
was an unnecessary imposition of congressional oversight which restricted
sovereignty and self-governance.43 The pueblos already guaranteed the
rights stated in the ICRA through their governance structures.44 However,
the values represented by the ICRA implicated western values which are
not necessarily the values of the pueblos.45
Congress enacted the ICRA despite the many tribal objections. The
ICRA applied almost all the Bill of Rights to the federally recognized
tribes.46 However, it “did not prohibit the establishment of a religion,
provide for an automatic right to a jury trial, or require the appointment of
counsel for indigents in criminal cases.”47 It also did not require a grand
jury or presentment.48 These exemptions were an attempt to compromise
between the western and traditional values. In effect, the ICRA encouraged
conformity with the western system while requiring limited civil rights
protections.
One of the more problematic limitations is that of the right to

(4)
(5)
(6)

compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his factor, and at his own
expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in
no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than
imprisonment for a term of six months for a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon
request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
Sec. 203. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of
the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.
Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202-03 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-03
(2010)).
42
See, LT. GOV. JUAN B. ABEITA, GOV. PAT CALABAZA, GOV. JUAN CHAVARRIA, GOV. ROBERT E.
LEWIS, & GOV. DON SANCHEZ, Rts. of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearings on H.R. 15419 and related
Bills before the Subcomm. on Indian Aff. of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Aff., 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 35-75 (1968).
43
Id.
44
Id. (The Pueblo Governor’s stated that they provided defendants with a tribal representative in
hearings, the right to a jury made up of tribal leaders, the right to freedom of speech and the right to
freedom of religion. However, these were not provided in a way that is identical to the western system.).
45
Id.
46
See Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202; U.S. Const. amend. I-X.
47
Creel, supra note 4, at 346. See also Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202.
48
See Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202; U.S. Const. amend. X (“No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime…”).
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assistance of counsel “at his own expense.”49 The BIA resisted adding in
the full constitutional protection of provided counsel in criminal cases due
to monetary constraints and a foreseen imbalance in the courts if non-law
trained judges were confronted with law trained counsel.50 These arguments
reflect western values of a highly trained legal structure and monetary
compensation. Significantly, the limitation of the right to counsel included
in ICRA was consistent with both federal and state law at the time. In 1938,
the U.S. Supreme Court had only ruled the right to appointed counsel to
extend to felonies in federal courts.51 In 1963, the right to appointed counsel
for felonies was extended to state jurisdictions.52 It wasn’t until 1972, four
years after the ICRA, that the right to appointed counsel was required for
both felonies and misdemeanors that could result in incarceration.53 The
ICRA limited tribal court criminal jurisdiction to the equivalent of
misdemeanors, by stating that a tribe could not sentence for longer than six
months and therefore matched the current federal and state requirements in
1968.54 Congress never amended the ICRA to require tribes to provide
counsel to indigents; however it did extend the maximum imprisonment
length to one year in 1986.55
Since 1986, there have been two more congressional acts which
have impacted tribal criminal jurisdiction. The first is the Tribal Law and
Order Act of 2010 (TLOA).56 This act allowed tribes to sentence defendants
up to nine years in one proceeding if they implemented full federal
protections for defendants, including providing counsel to indigent
defendants.57 In addition, tribes seeking to implement the greater sentencing
scheme must provide “a legally trained judge to preside over the criminal
proceeding; public access to tribal laws, rules of evidence, rules of criminal
49

Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(6).
Creel, supra note 4, at 346 (citing The Constitutional Rights of the Amer. Indian: hearing Before the
Subcomm. On the Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 13 (1961)).
51
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding “The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal
courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty
unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”).
52
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1970) (holding that it was unconstitutional to deprive the
defendant in a felony trial of the right to counsel in state court); See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (courts interpreted the holding in Gideon to mean it applied only to a felony case
until Argersinger).
53
Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial.”); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that
actual imprisonment is what triggers the right to counsel); contra Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977)(concurring opinion states the test should be authorized imprisonment as opposed to actual
imprisonment).
54
Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7).
55
Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988)).
56
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2258 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302).
57
Id.
50
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procedure, including rules governing recusal of judges; and a record of
tribal criminal proceedings.”58 By requiring tribes to modify their structure
to look like the western structure if they wished to incarcerate, the United
States again encouraged assimilation, while simultaneously returning
criminal jurisdiction and sovereignty to the tribes who could afford to
provide these extended protections. Many others have been unable to regain
sovereign authority over criminal jurisdiction and the ability to decide
which punishments are appropriate due to an inability to implement the
necessary changes.
The second change to tribal criminal jurisdiction occurred in 2013
with the enactment of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act
(VAWA).59 This act permitted tribes to “exercise special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction over all persons,” including non-natives who had a
special relationship with the tribe.60 To assert VAWA jurisdiction, the tribe
must provide the defendant with the enhanced rights described in TLOA, as
well as the right to a trial by an impartial jury, and all other rights necessary
under the United States Constitution.61 As of March 2015, five tribes
throughout the country possessed the authority to use this extended
jurisdiction of VAWA.62 VAWA has the same implications as TLOA in
that it encourages conformity but also returns sovereignty to the tribes.
Neither TLOA nor VAWA changed the limitation in the ICRA
which does not require tribal governments to provide indigent defendants
with counsel in criminal proceedings where imprisonment is implicated.
For tribal governments which have chosen to retain fully traditional court
structures,63 this may not be an issue. Traditional court structures have
different value systems and ways to protect those values. For example,
many traditional court structures use family members or group
representation for the accused. Whether fully traditional court systems offer
protections for civil rights is not the focus of this paper. Rather this paper
will discuss hybrid tribal governance structures which have adopted a
western court structure but not implemented full civil protections. The court
observed is one such as these.
58

Creel, supra note 4, at 350 (citing Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234).
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 127 Stat. 54
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
60
The defendant must “(i) reside[] in the Indian country of the participating tribe; (ii) [be] employed in
the Indian country of the participating tribe; or (iii) [be] a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of
(I) a member of the participating tribe; or (II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the
participating tribe.” Id.
61
Id.
62
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013 PILOT PROJECT, https://www.justice.gov/tribal/vawa-2013pilot-project (last updated March 13, 2015).
63
Fully traditional court structures refers to tribal courts which are based on unique internal structure.
Each tribe will define what it means to be fully traditional, commonly it is based on laws established
pre-European contact.
59
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Observations in a Pueblo Court in 2017

I observed one of the pueblo courts which has begun the process of
adopting a western court structure. Before providing my observations at the
court, I will detail a brief history of the pueblos, a brief profile of the court,
and the court procedure which occurred in all six cases.
A.

Brief “Legal” History of the Pueblos

The pueblos of New Mexico have a unique legal and cultural
history. Currently, nineteen pueblos in New Mexico are federally
recognized and fall under the policies discussed earlier in this paper.64
While the pueblos are related and share a common origin story, each has its
own unique culture, identity, and governance structure.65 They were first
contacted by the Spanish in the 1500s.66 By the mid-1600s the Spanish had
obtained control of the pueblos.67 Unlike the colonizers on the east coast of
the United States, the Spanish allowed the tribes to retain local control with
some added government structures.68 Prior to Spanish contact, the pueblos’
governance structure consisted of a Cacique, his War Chiefs, and their
assistants.69 The Cacique was the head of the pueblo who led the tribe in all
things, spiritual and secular.70 He selected two other leaders, termed War
Chiefs, who assisted him in enforcing the laws of the tribe.71 The pueblos
also had a complex social order consisting of moieties, which had various
ceremonial responsibilities, and clans, which structured the familial
relationships of the pueblos.72
The Spanish brought with them the civil legal system. They
imposed other government positions, including that of the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Sheriffs, and Fiscales.73 The Governor and his
Lieutenant were intended to impose Spanish rule; however, they often
protected the religious leaders from persecution for practicing traditional
ceremonies in secret.74 The Sheriffs also enforced Spanish laws.75 Lastly,
64

JOE SANDO, PUEBLO NATIONS: EIGHT CENTURIES OF PUEBLO INDIAN HISTORY 7 (1991) (providing a
full history of the Pueblos through the 1980s).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 47-52.
67
Id. at 52-59, 248-249.
68
Id. at 13.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 13, 30-35.
73
Id. at 14.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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the Fiscales served as an intermediary between the Catholic Church
officials and the pueblo officials.76 Notwithstanding the influence of the
Spanish and the Catholic Church, the pueblos retained much of their own
culture.77 Pueblos’ modern governance structures still include the traditional
leaders and social organization as well as those positions introduced by the
Spanish.
The Spanish provided crucial recognition that enabled tribes to
survive much of the United States’ processes of termination and
assimilation. The Spanish government set aside land for the pueblos
through land grants and allowed the pueblos to govern themselves if they
also followed Spanish law.78 The period of Spanish control was not without
problems, including forced Indian labor, high taxes to the Spanish leaders,
and suppression of the pueblos’ traditional religion.79 This lead to the
Pueblo Revolt of 1680, and resulted in the overthrow of the Spanish
government for twelve years.80 When the Spanish returned, they struck an
unofficial agreement in which the pueblos would respect Spanish authority,
the Spanish government would not try to suppress their religion or culture,
and both would work to protect the lands from attack by other Indians.81
The Spanish government exercised control until 1824 when Mexico gained
its independence.82
The newly formed Mexican government did little to influence the
governments of the pueblos who continued their traditional governance and
the Spanish modifications.83 However, the Mexican government continued
to recognize the land rights of the pueblos and attempted to protect those
lands from being illegally taken.84 Despite these efforts, there was loss of
pueblo land through both legal and illegal means.85 In 1848, the Mexican
government signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Treaty) to end the
Mexican-American War.86 The Treaty required the United States to
recognize all current land ownership.87 While the pueblos did not have
treaties, as many other tribes did, they possessed the Spanish land grants
which, in turn, were protected by the Treaty. During the years before New
Mexico was granted statehood, the Territory of New Mexico treated the
76

Id.
Id. at 17.
78
See Id. at 13-14, 59.
79
Id. at 59-63.
80
Id. at 63-70. For a full account of the Pueblo Revolt, see , e.g., FRANKLIN FOLSOM, INDIAN UPRISING
ON THE RIO GRANDE: THE PUEBLO REVOLT OF 1680 (Univ. of NM Press 1996) (1973).
81
Sando, supra note 63, at 79-81.
82
Id. at 70-81.
83
Id. at 83-86.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 86.
87
Id.
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pueblos as any other municipality of the territory and did not apply federal
Indian laws of the time.88 This changed in 1910 when the United States
granted the pueblos federal Indian status through the Enabling Act of New
Mexico.89 The act set forth guidelines for the new state governments of
Arizona and New Mexico, including an express statement that the federal
terms of “Indian” and “Indian Country” would include the pueblos.90 This
officially subjected the pueblos to federal Indian laws and policies,
including the legislative history of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country
outlined in Part I.
B.

Profile of One Modern Pueblo Court Observed by an Outsider

Each pueblo has established court structures which range from fully
traditional91 to fully western, with most establishing hybrid courts
somewhere in the middle of the two. The few who have completely adopted
the western structure provide law trained judges, prosecutors, and public
defenders, as well as written codes. There are others whose structures
operate in a completely traditional fashion with all cases heard before the
governor or tribal council without any representation. In these instances, the
courts apply either customary law92 in conjunction with tribal codes or the
Code of Federal Regulations93 (CFR) which the CIOs utilize or some
combination of both.94 In these courts there might be law-trained judges,
prosecutors, and public defenders. There might also be lay judges, law
officers who function as prosecutors, and lay representatives. There may
also be a combination of both law-trained and lay-trained officials.
The Tribal Court observed is a hybrid structure. The jurisdiction of
the tribe was bifurcated into a Traditional Court and a Contemporary Court
in 2016.95 The Contemporary Court has the criminal jurisdiction and
resembles a western court structure with some significant modifications.
The Pueblo has one law-trained judge, BIA law enforcement officers acting
as both police and prosecutor, and no public defender. The Tribal Court
does allow attorneys in to the courtroom to represent clients, but few
88

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 388-89 (1942),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015008574082;view=1up;seq=6.
89
Id.; Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557.
90
Id.
91
Based on my experience, fully traditional in the Pueblo context refers to the structure formed under
Spanish control which utilizes both customary and civil law traditions.
92
In my experience in Pueblo courts, these customary laws can be chthonic or a blend of Spanish and
chthonic. In addition, they may be written or oral.
93
25 C.F.R. § 11.400-54 (2018).
94
To determine what civil protections are built into the fully traditional Pueblo court structure, a
separate case study would have to be done. The remaining Pueblos have various hybrid court structures.
95
There is a complex set of rules which delineate the subject matter jurisdiction of each court.
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defendants obtain outside defense. The Tribal Council has incorporated the
CFR section that applies to the non-sovereign federal instrumentality CFR
courts as its criminal code.96 According to the Chief Judge, the court hears
between 150-300 criminal cases per year for which most crimes have a
possibility of incarceration. Of these cases, approximately 95% of the
defendants pled guilty or no contest97 at arraignment without any plea deal.
The remaining five percent are pleas of not guilty. When this occurs, a trial
date is set. However, the court has yet to have an actual trial since its
creation three years ago. The cases are either dismissed or a plea deal is
arranged between the BIA law enforcement officer and the defendant. The
most common reason for dismissal is undue delay caused by unavailability
of the BIA law enforcement officers and defense counsel who are often
located at a distance from the Pueblo.
C.

Court Procedure

Over a five-month period, I observed six arraignments in the
Contemporary Court. Each of these arraignments followed the same
procedure. The judge would begin by asking three preliminary questions to
establish the court’s jurisdiction and the defendant’s ability to knowingly
enter a plea:
1. If the defendant was a member of the Pueblo or other federally
recognized tribe,
2. If the defendant understands the English language; and
3. If the defendant is currently under the influence of alcohol or any
mind-altering drug.
If the defendant is not a member of any federally recognized tribe
the case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.98 If the defendant does not
speak English, there is court staff available who speak the language of the
Pueblo and are available to translate.99 If the defendant indicates they are
under the influence of alcohol or other mind-altering drug, the case is
reassigned a court date. Once the jurisdiction and ability of the defendant to
enter a plea is established, the judge moves on to an advisement of rights.
96

25 C.F.R. § 11.400-54.
Defined as “ a criminal plea in which the defendant does not argue innocence but impliedly accepts as
true the charges and seeks a sentence without an express finding of guilt, in the hopes of a lighter
sentence than might be levied if the defendant were convicted after contesting the charge or charges, but
also in the expectation that some measure of civil liability or other consequence of a guilty verdict might
be avoided.” Nolo Contendere (No Contest or Nolo or Non Vult Contendere), BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).
98
See Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
99
In other courts there may be language barriers that implicate a due process violation, however it does
not appear to be an issue in this court.
97
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The judge then reads the defendant the following statement:
You have these rights guaranteed under the Indian Civil Rights Act
and under the laws of the [Pueblo]:
1. The right to know and understand the charges against you.
2. The right to enter the plea of Guilty, Not Guilty, or No Contest.
3. The right to an attorney at your own choosing and at your own
expense.
4. The right to a speedy and public trial by the Tribal Court or
Jury
5. The right to confront witness against you and to cross examine
those witnesses
6. The right to call your own witnesses by subpoenas.
7. The right to be released on bail or under conditions determined
by the court.
8. The right to remain silent and require the Pueblo to prove its
case against you beyond a reasonable doubt.
9. Due to the sequestered hearings for persons under the age of
18, there is no right to a jury hearing.
10. The right to appeal a conviction.100
The defendant is provided the Advice of Rights Form, which he is asked to
initial and sign in acknowledgement that he understands his rights. Once the
defendant has signed the form, the judge reads into the record the accused
charges. Afterwards, the judge asks the defendant what he wishes to plea to
each charge. Once a plea is given, the judge confirms that the defendant
intends to enter the plea and understands a plea of guilty or no contest
waives some of the defendant’s rights. The defendant must verbally
acknowledge that he understands this waiver of rights. Then the pleas are
entered. If the defendant plead guilty or no contest, the judge then asks if
the defendant would like to say anything on their behalf before deliberating
their sentence. If they do not wish to say anything, the judge normally asks
a few questions, including: where the defendant lives, their ability to travel,
whether they have a job, whether they have any children, any prior criminal
history, and in cases of substance abuse, whether the defendant considers
themselves to be an addict and if they have received any kind of in-patient
treatment for their substance abuse. After all the pleas are entered, the judge
retires to judicial chambers to deliberate on sentencing.
Sentences are entered on the same day. The judge takes a short
recess and then returns to pronounce the sentence. The judge indicated that
in most cases, a potential sentence was contemplated prior to the
100

Modified from the court’s Advice of Rights Form
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arraignment hearing. After hearing the defendant’s statements, the judge
then reexamines the anticipated sentence and may adjust the sentence if
necessary. Most of the cases observed were alcohol or drug related offenses
which resulted in suspended jail time subject to completion of substance
abuse programs. The Pueblo has an arrangement with an in-patient
treatment facility for substance abuse and will pay for tribal members to
attend this treatment program. During my observations, the judge used this
option for all defendants who had not yet been to an in-patient treatment
facility rather than imposing jail times, regardless of how many times they
had previously been convicted of substance abuse related crimes.
D.

Observations

Over the course of five months, I was able to observe three days of
arraignment hearings, for a total of six arraignments.101 This represents
approximately four percent of the total cases estimated to have occurred
during 2017. For each of the arraignments I will provide background on the
defendant, the charges, their plea, the sentence, and any other unique
aspects of their arraignment. It is important to note that none of the
defendants had counsel present with them and none of them requested
counsel. It is less clear if they waived the right to counsel as there was no
question from the judge indicating they understood they were waiving their
right to counsel prior to entering a plea. I was not provided any criminal
history information unless it was discussed in open court. I will follow my
observations with a short commentary on my overall perspective.
Defendant 1: Male, member of the Pueblo, Adult. Charged with
Assault102 and Disorderly Conduct.103 During arraignment, the defendant
appeared confused on what each of the pleas meant and changed his plea
multiple times. He seemed to be inclined to admit guilt but feared the
consequences. When the judge asked if he understood the pleas, he stated
he did not. The judge proceeded to further explain the differences. The
defendant claimed to understand the pleas and proceeded to enter pleas of
no contest. He changed his mind once more to pleas of guilty. At this point
the judge was inclined to enter pleas of not guilty on behalf of the defendant
101

This represents a snapshot of the court and is not enough to demonstrate an accurate sample size.
Observations were difficult to schedule due to the court’s low case numbers and holiday schedules. See
author notes for specific dates.
102
25 C.F.R. § 11.400 (“Assault is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by
mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor.”); Id. § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result
in “Up to 1 year in prison, or a fine of up to $ 5,000, or both.”).
103
Id. § 11.441 (“An offense under this section is a petty misdemeanor if the actor's purpose is to cause
substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he or she persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable
warning or request to desist.”); Id. § 11.450(b (A petty misdemeanor may result in “up to 6 months in
prison, or a fine of up to $ 2,500, or both.”).
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so that he might have a chance to form a plea agreement with the BIA
officer in charge of his case. It was hard to follow what the outcome of the
pleas were while observing. I was later informed by the Judge that the
defendant pled guilty to the charge of Disorderly Conduct and not guilty to
the charge of Assault.
The defendant was sentenced to 120 days of supervised probation
plus a fee of $185.00 for the crime of Disorderly Conduct. At a later pretrial hearing the defendant took a plea deal for the Assault charge and was
sentenced to an additional 120 days of supervised probation for a plea of
guilty.104
Defendant 2: Male, member of the Pueblo, Adult, currently on
probation for a federal conviction. Charged with Assault,105 Public
Intoxication,106 Possession of a Controlled Substance,107 Open Container,108
and Possession with Intent to Distribute.109 The defendant entered pleas of
no contest to all charges except Possession with Intent to Distribute. The
defendant pled not guilty to Possession with Intent to Distribute and is
currently awaiting trial on this charge. When allowed to speak to the court
the defendant made the statement, “I know I’m going back to jail,”
presumably about the violation of his federal probation with the tribal
arrest.
The defendant was sentenced to 60 days incarceration for the
Assault charge and an additional 30 days incarceration for the charge of
Possession of a Controlled Substance. He was also charged a fine of
$100.00 for the charge of Public Intoxication and fine of $100.00 for the
charge of Open Container. This is the only defendant whose sentences were
not deferred.
Defendant 3: Male, member of the Pueblo, Adult. The defendant
was charged with Driving while Intoxicated (DWI) 110 and Public
104

This information was provided by the Court, the pre-trial hearing process was not observed for this
paper.
105
25 C.F.R. § 11.400 (“Assault is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by
mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor.”) § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result in
“up to 1 year in prison, or a fine of up to $ 5,000, or both.”).
106
Per Tribal Ordinance intoxication is punishable with up to 30 days incarceration or $300.00 fine or
both. See author notes.
107
25 C.F.R. § 11.452 (“Violations of paragraph (a) of this section are punishable as a misdemeanor.”);
Id. § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result in “Up to 1 year in prison, or a fine of up to $ 5,000, or
both.”).
108
Per Tribal Ordinance Open Container is punishable with up to 30 days incarceration or $300.00 fine
or both. See author notes.
109
Per Tribal Ordinance Possession with intent to Distribute is punishable with up to 1-year
incarceration or find up to $5,000.00 or both. See author notes.
110
25 C.F.R. § 11.445 (“A person who shall drive, operate or be in physical control of any motor vehicle
when his or her alcohol concentration is 0.10 or more shall be guilty of driving while intoxicated, a
misdemeanor.”); Id. § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result in “up to 1 year in prison, or a fine of up to
$ 5,000, or both.”).
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Intoxication.111 He pled no contest to both charges. This was the only
defendant who openly spoke to the judge about his personal circumstances.
He admitted being an alcoholic and stated that he wanted help with his
alcoholism. He also admitted that his actions were improper and that he
should have known better.
He was fined $600.00 for the DWI which was suspended subject to
completion of six months of supervised probation and the DWI prevention
program which is paid for by the tribe. He was fined an additional $100.00
for the Public Intoxication charge, which was not suspended.
Defendant 4: Female, member of the Pueblo, Adult. Charged with
Neglect of Child112 and Public Intoxication.113 The judge mentioned that
there probably should have been three counts of Neglect of Child as
normally there is one count per child and she is a single parent to three
children. However, the judge stated that this is an error in the charges which
he would not correct without motion by the BIA law enforcement officer.
She pled guilty to both charges. After entering her pleas, the judge asked
her various questions. The defendant stated she had been previously
incarcerated for eight months for a DWI which resulted in a car crash while
her children were with her. Since her release, she had been sober and
claimed this was her first relapse. She thought that an in-patient treatment
for her alcoholism might be beneficial to her. She was also worried about
having her children removed. The defendant was employed but she was
terminated two weeks previously. She was currently looking for new
employment. Before leaving to deliberate on her sentence, the judge
reminded the defendant of the consequences of her actions, focusing on the
impact to her children who were unattended while she was inebriated. Due
to her lack of supervision they were found in a dangerous situation, which
is why the police were called. There was a member of the Pueblo’s social
services department present; because it is likely there will be a civil case to
remove the children from the home for which the result of the criminal
charges will be significant.
The defendant was sentenced to three months imprisonment for
Neglect of Children which was suspended subject to her completion of 12
months supervised probation and a 180-day in-patient treatment program.
While awaiting admission to the treatment program, she was required to
111

Per Tribal Ordinance, Public Intoxication is punishable with up to 30 days incarceration or $300.00
fine or both. See author notes.
112
25 C.F.R. § 11.424 (“A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18
commits a misdemeanor if he or she knowingly endangers the child's welfare by violating a duty of care,
protection or support.”); Id. § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result in “up to 1 year in prison, or a fine
of up to $ 5,000, or both.”).
113
Per Tribal Ordinance, Public Intoxication is punishable with up to 30 days incarceration or $300.00
fine or both. See author notes.
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wear an ankle alcohol monitoring bracelet. She was also fined $100.00 for
the Public Intoxication. The judge indicated that the outcome of this case
would likely have been more severe if she had already been given the
opportunity to go to an in-patient treatment program for her prior
conviction. The judge stated he often will only defer to treatment programs
if they have not already gone through one.
Defendant 5: Male, member of the Pueblo, Adult. The defendant
was charged with DWI,114 Open Container,115 Liquor Control Ordinance
Violation.116 The defendant pled guilty to all charges. The defendant made
no statement on his behalf and answered the judge’s questions with little to
no explanation.
The defendant was fined $600.00 for the DWI which was
suspended subject to completion of six months of supervised probation and
the DWI prevention program. Defendant was also fined $100.00 for the
Open Container charge and another $100.00 for the Liquor Control
Ordinance Violation.
Defendant 6: Female, member of the Pueblo, Adult. The defendant
was charged with Public Intoxication,117 Domestic Violence,118 and two
counts of Neglect of Children.119 She pled guilty to all charges but the
Neglect of Children charges, which were set for trial. During the
arraignment she expressed confusion about the procedure and how the plea
fit into it. After the judge explained it further, she stated she understood,
and the trial proceeded. However, she still had a quizzical look on her face,
indicating she might still have been confused. There were two letters also
submitted to the judge on her behalf. The first was from a tribal employee
who works with the Pueblo’s home visiting program. This program helps
parents in the home to become better parents. It stated she had been in the
program for one and a half years and was a fit parent during that time. The
second was from her employer which detailed that the employer had
25 C.F.R. § 11.445 (“A person who shall drive, operate or be in physical control of any motor vehicle
when his or her alcohol concentration is 0.10 or more shall be guilty of driving while intoxicated, a
misdemeanor.”); Id. § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result in “up to 1 year in prison, or a fine of up to
$ 5,000, or both.”).
115
Per Tribal Ordinance, Open Container is punishable with up to 30 days incarceration or $300.00 fine
or both. See author notes.
116
The Pueblo is a dry reservation, meaning that the mere possession of alcohol is a crime.
117
Per Tribal Ordinance, Public Intoxication is punishable with up to 30 days incarceration or $300.00
fine or both. See author notes.
118
25 C.F.R. § 11.454 (“A person who commits domestic violence by inflicting physical harm, bodily
injury, or sexual assault, or inflicting the fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or sexual assault
on a family member, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Id. § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result in “up to
1 year in prison, or a fine of up to $ 5,000, or both.”).
119
25 C.F.R. § 11.424 (“A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18
commits a misdemeanor if he or she knowingly endangers the child's welfare by violating a duty of care,
protection or support.”); Id. § 11.450(a) (A misdemeanor may result in “up to 1 year in prison, or a fine
of up to $ 5,000, or both.”).
114
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previously worried about the defendant but that she was doing better and
was a hardworking employee.
The defendant was fined $600.00 and five days of incarceration for
the Domestic Violence charge which was suspended subject to completion
of six months unsupervised probation. She was also fined $100.00 for the
Public Intoxication charge.
E.

Civil Rights Commentary on Arraignments

The three crucial issues I observed at court were: (1) the lack of a
public defender120 or public defense system, (2) the unclear role of the
judge, and (3) the foreign nature of the Pueblo’s proceeding. First, the
justice system lacked public defenders. The complete lack of public defense
led to several critical failures in the adversary system – namely confusion,
easy conviction, and severe collateral consequences.
Two of the six defendants I observed stated they were confused
about the proceedings and the pleas they were entering. Both continued to
have quizzical looks after the judge provided further explanations. This
indicated to me that they likely did not understand the charges and
consequences. I am also inclined to believe that most of the other
defendants were also confused, but simply did not express that confusion by
any outward means. The exception to this might be the defendant who had
previously been through the federal system, although the differences from
federal proceedings may have still led to confusion. Confusion is not an
uncommon thing in the courtroom. Individuals in state and federal court are
likely often confused. The difference is that they have an individual with
them who is not. That individual is an attorney, whether provided by the
government or retained by the individual, who understands the system and
can explain, as well as, advise them on the best course of action. The judge
can only go so far to explain the situation to the defendant and he certainly
cannot advise the defendant on what course of action to take.
In addition, none of the individuals advocated for reduced or
deferred sentences. A public defender advocates for reduced or deferred
sentences. While this judge frequently uses deferment programs, there is no
guarantee that they will be offered, especially as defendants are likely
unaware of them prior to trial. This is the problem. The defendants are not
knowledgeable enough in the law to properly defend or advocate for
themselves and thus must rely on the goodwill of the judge. It could be
argued that due to the fact most received reduced or deferred sentences,
120

Public defender is used here to refer to an individual who understands the legal system in which the
trial occurs and advocates for the defendant in court. Whether this person is a lay advocate or someone
with a degree and state bar license is a question for future discussion.
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defendants do not need representation. However, under Argersinger,
“absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for
any offense … unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”121 Three
of the defendants were sentenced to actual incarceration and of those, one
served the sentence. The other two were given deferred sentences but had a
possibility to serve the actual time given a violation of the deferment. Had
these cases been in state or federal court, the defendants would have been
provided counsel if the court wished to sentence the defendants to jail time.
In addition, without anyone to review the file, there is a possibility the
charges could have been dismissed for lack of evidence, improper evidence
gathering, or other technical reasons. This leads into the second issue.
The second issue is the confusion surrounding the judge’s role. As
an observer I was confused as to the limits of the judge’s power. The Judge
confirmed that there was a shift in power towards the judge in this setting.
The Judge also was unsure of where the limits to judicial power were and
erred on the side of following United States law due to the Judge’s legal
training. In the United States common law structure, a judge can create and
interpret laws, accept pleadings, act as referee between attorneys and
sentence defendants according to guidelines set forth by the government. 122
Judges do not make findings of fact or identify civil rights violations in
criminal jury trials.123 Facts are left to the jury in most criminal trials, and it
is the role of the defense attorney to find and bring forth civil rights
violations.124 Judges simply rule on those violations when brought forth.125
In civil law traditions, the judge has a slightly different role. “The judge is
presumed to know the law and has to apply it, where it should be
applied.”126 The charges are often brought by the judge, who questions
witnesses, and determines the appropriate remedy as indicated by the
code.127 The attorney’s presence ensures that the civil rights are not
violated, but the judge is expected to identify and address civil rights
violations in their application of the law.128
In this Pueblo court, the judge must play a careful balancing game,
where he must look for the civil rights violations to protect the defendant,
121

407 U.S. 25, 37 (non-binding in tribal courts imposing the ICRA right to retain counsel).
VIVIENNE O’CONNOR, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS, 23-24
(International Network to Promote the Rule of Law 2012).
123
Id. at 24. Jury trials are only an automatic right in the U.S. structure when the defendant faces a
possibility of six months imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 23-24.
126
GLENN, supra note 2, at 144.
127
In some civil law countries there are prosecutors who have varying levels of activity during the
investigation and trial. O’CONNOR, supra note 119, at 20-21 (International Network to Promote the Rule
of
Law
2012).
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/Common%20and%20Civil%20Law%20Traditions.pdf.
128
See, Id.
122
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while simultaneously representing the government’s interest in convicting
criminals as the BIA officers only appear during trials, not arraignments.
This is like the civil law tradition, but it still lacks a defense attorney.
During arraignment, there is no witness examination which means the judge
is ruling based on the presumption that the law enforcement officer has
presented accurate facts in his report. All of this shifts the power in the
courtroom towards the judge. The judge then has an immense amount of
power without anyone in the room to check him, unlike both the civil and
the common law legal traditions which provide defense attorneys.129 The
Judge observed is very conscious of this fact and tries to be impartial and
fair to the defendant. This is likely why there have been so many dismissals
for undue delay.
Due to recent habeas corpus petitions130 against tribal court
convictions which have cited judicial bias, there is reason to believe that
without stated limits on judicial power there is a likelihood of improper
judicial discretion.131 The Judge has done a good job in dealing with this
imbalance, but a different judge may have made different choices, such as
adding additional charges to Defendant 4 due to the knowledge that she had
endangered multiple children, or not recommending deferment to treatment
for all defendants. A defendant would likely not be able to identify this as a
violation of court rules and due process. Even if a defendant was able to
identify this issue, they might be hesitant to argue against the additional
charges due to the culture of the Pueblo.
The final issue is that the Tribal Court observed does not require
accommodation of cultural values. The judge informed me that within the
129

While both the traditions provide attorneys for criminal defendants, their roles are very different. In
the common law tradition, the defense attorney can investigate, call witnesses, and play a very active
role in presenting their case. In the civil law tradition, the defense attorney cannot investigate, speak to
witnesses, call witnesses, and overall plays a reduced role in the case. They however can still explain
proceedings to their client, view the case file, and ask the judge to ask witnesses questions or consider
certain aspects of the case. Id. at 19-20.
130
Defined as a petition “to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement; to liberate those who may
be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody; or to obtain a proper
custody of persons illegally detained from the control of those who are entitled to the custody of them.”
Habeas corpus, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (LexisNexis 2010).
131
See, Romero v. Goodrich, No. 1:09-CV-232-RB-DJS (D.N.M. Mar. 9, 2010) (habeas petition
alleging “lack of counsel, judicial bias, and the failure to have his Miranda rights read to him”)
(dismissed for mootness); Cantrell v. Jackson, No. 1:16-CV-33-GF-BMM (D. Mont. Aug. 30, 2016)
(habeas petition alleging “unlawful release of medical records, judicial bias, denial of competency
evaluation, denial of effective assistance of counsel ...”) (dismissed for lack of exhaustion); See also
Aguilar v. Rodriguez, No. 1:17-CV-1264 JCH/SMV (D.N.M. Sep. 18, 2018) (dismissed for lack of
exhaustion); Coriz v. Rodriquez, No. 1:17-CV-1258 JB/KBM (D.N.M. June 7, 2018); Tortalita v.
Geisen, No. 1:17-CV-684-RB-KRS (D.N.M. May 31, 2018) (petition granted and conviction vacated);
Van Pelt v. Giesen, No. 1:17-CV-647-RB-KRS (D.N.M. May 11, 2018) (petition granted and conviction
vacated); Toya v. Toledo, No. 1:17-CV-17-0258-JCH-KBM (D.N.M. Sep. 26, 2017) (petition granted
and conviction vacated); Talk v. Southern UTE Det. Ctr., No. 1:17-CV-00669-WJ-KK (Aug. 15, 2017);
Garcia v. Elwell, No. 1:17-CV-00333-WJ-GJF (D.N.M. May 25, 2017).
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Pueblo culture they value admitting wrongdoing.132 As a member of the
culture, one should always admit wrongdoing and seek ways to make
amends to the community. This is in opposition to the western culture
where we value the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. While the
western courts experience an equitable percentage of guilty pleas, those
pleas are often the result of plea deals that were entered prior to the
arraignment or shortly after an entry of not guilty, as sentencing does not
always happen the same day.133 While it is true that defendants have the
right to represent themselves, and can enter a plea without a negotiated plea
settlement, the presence of an attorney in a public defense system plays a
critical role. The attorney is present to assist in making the decision and
guiding the defendant to the best choice for them. Only one of the above
defendants entered a plea deal. In federal court, nine in ten defendants enter
negotiated plea deals.134 While in this Pueblo court, one in six entered a
negotiated plea deal and six out of six pled guilty to at least one charge
without a plea deal. This is a stark difference caused by a court structure
that does not accommodate the values of the culture in which it sits.135 The
judge did reward the defendants above for their admittance of guilt and
thereby accommodated the cultural value. However, this is not a procedural
requirement of their system; it is again the goodwill of the judge. These
three issues come together to create fertile ground for civil rights violations.
Due to the high level of habeas corpus petitions from tribal courts without
written protections, there is a heightened risk of future civil rights violations
in this court.
CONCLUSION

The ICRA was created to continue a long history of federal
regulation over tribal jurisdiction. This history was not arbitrary, rather it
stems from the policy of assimilation that is present throughout federal
Indian law. By requiring tribes to conform to values that might not be
present in their system, the ICRA pushed tribal criminal courts towards the
132

See also, Christine Zuni Cruz, Four Questions on Critical Race Praxis: Lessons from Two Young
Lives in Indian Country, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2133, 2156 (2005) (socialization to accountability in
Indigenous societies runs against bedrock principles of Anglo-American criminal law of pleading
innocence/guilt and the right to remain silent).
133
97% of federal cases are pled guilty. U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE JOHN L. KANE, Plea Bargaining and the
Innocent, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-the-innocent (Dec. 12,
2014). 90% of cases are pled through negotiated plea deals. SARA J. BERMAN, The Basics of a Plea
Bargain, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/the-basics-plea-bargain.html (last accessed Nov. 26,
2017).
134
90% of cases are pled through negotiated plea deals. SARA J. BERMAN, The Basics of a Plea Bargain,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/the-basics-plea-bargain.html (last accessed Nov. 26, 2017).
135
Because the western system is formed from an entirely different value system, finding a way for the
western structure to accommodate the values of the Pueblo is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
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western adversarial system. This system does not always fit the local
communities and can result in civil rights violations.
The disconnect between the legal system and the cultural values of
the community was seen during my court observations at the Tribal Court.
While there were no civil rights violations witnessed, there were areas of
concern because of the lack of protections. This was especially troubling as
other pueblo courts have seen an increase in habeas corpus petitions
stemming from the areas of concern witnessed, specifically the lack of a
public defense system, a shift in the judge’s power, and indirect punishment
for adherence to pueblo cultural traditions.
Tribal leaders should examine the structure they have created in
response to the implementation of the ICRA to determine if there are civil
rights violations occurring. If there are violations, they should look at the
history of their tribe and its cultural values to find ways to solve those
violations. In addition, the solutions should be implemented with the
consent of the tribal government as well as the tribal people. Tribes are
sovereign nations and can make decisions for themselves. The federal
government should find a better way to allow tribes to exercise this
sovereignty.

